

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 255884
ORIGIN IO-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /015 R

66011

DRAFTED BY: IO/UNA:BJSHARP

APPROVED BY: IO/UNA:CGRICE

-----012570 262256Z /73

R 260301Z OCT 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 255884

FOR ED MEZVINSKY FROM CONNIE GRICE

FOL TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO BELGRADE FROM USNATO

DTD 21 OCT 1977 QTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 10187

BELGRADE FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, NATO, SW

SUBJECT: CSCE/CBMS: SWEDISH PROPOSAL ON COORDINATED
MANEUVERS

1. AT OCTOBER 18 AND 21 POLADS MEETINGS, TURKISH, UK
AND NETHERLANDS REPS SAID THE TENTATIVE REACTION OF THEIR
AUTHORITIES TO THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL (REFTEL) WAS POSITIVE
ALTHOUGH THEY WISHED TO GIVE IT MORE CAREFUL STUDY.
NORWEGIAN REP SAID OSLO'S INITIAL REACTION ALSO WAS
POSITIVE, ALTHOUGH HIS AUTHORITIES BELIEVED THE 25,000
THRESHOLD SHOULD BE REPLACED BY DOTS.

2. CANADIAN REP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES SAW PROBLEMS IN THE
SWEDISH PROPOSAL. FRENCH REP SAID REACTION OF PARIS WAS
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NEGATIVE.

3. IMS REP SAID THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SWEDISH PRO-
POSAL WOULD BE ADMINISTRATIVELY VERY COMPLEX AND BURDEN-
SOME. IMS REP SUBMITTED PAPER TRANSMITTED BELOW.

4. FRG REP SAID MOST ALLIED MANEUVERS TO BE NOTIFIED

UNDER THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL WOULD TAKE PLACE ON FRG TERRITORY. HIS AUTHORITIES CALCULATED THAT AS MANY AS ONE MANEUVER EACH MONTH ON FRG TERRITORY WOULD HAVE TO BE NOTIFIED. THEY SAW DRAWBACKS TO TOO FREQUENT NOTIFICATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THAT THEY GAVE RISE TO EASTERN PROPAGANDA CHARGES ABOUT NATO MILITARY ACTIVITIES. EMPHASIZING BONN'S OPPOSITION TO THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL, FRG REP CIRCULATED PAPER TRANSMITTED BELOW.

5. POLADS AGREED TO RETURN TO THIS QUESTION AT OCTOBER 25 MEETING.

6. ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE, IF POSSIBLE BY OCTOBER 25. BEGIN TEXT FRG NOTE:

WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THIS POSSIBLE SWEDISH PROPOSAL.

1. A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL ON THE INCLUSION OF SPLIT MANOEUVRES HAS SHOWN THAT WE DO NOT POSSESS ANY INFORMATION INDICATING THAT THE WP IS SYSTEMATICALLY SPLITTING ITS MANOEUVERS IN ORDER TO EVADE THE CBM PARAMETERS.

2. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THAT, AS A COUNTRY WHERE FORCES OF SEVERAL NATO COUNTRIES

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ARE STATIONED, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IS ALSO A MAIN EXERCISE COUNTRY. THUS, IF THE PROPOSAL WERE TO BE PUT INTO PRACTICE, WE WOULD BE THE COUNTRY MOST CONCERNED. A FIRST ROUGH SUMMARY OF THE EXERCISES IN 1977 ON GERMAN TERRITORY INDICATES THAT, IF THE PROPOSED PARAMETERS WERE USED,

-NOTIFICATIONS WOULD HAVE BEEN NECESSARY AT LEAST ONCE EVERY MONTH,

-SMALLER MANOEUVRES BY SOME ALLIES AND BY THE GERMAN FORCES WOULD HAVE HAD TO ANNOUNCED BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

3. THE PROPOSED PARAMETERS WOULD RESTRICT THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE NATO COUNTRIES SINCE, WHENEVER SEVERAL NATIONAL EXERCISES ARE HELD ON THE TERRITORY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE LATTER WOULD BE OBLIGED, IF THE PARAMETERS ARE MET (IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MANOEUVRES WITHIN 15 DAYS AND 250 KM AS WELL AS PARTICIPATION OF MORE THAN 25,000 MEN), TO NOTIFY MANOEUVRES CARRIED OUT BY OTHER COUNTRIES EVEN IF THIS IS NOT THE WISH DR THE INTEREST OF THE FRIENDLY NATO COUNTRY CARRYING OUT AN EXERCISE ON GERMAN TERRITORY.

4. THE EASTERN REACTION TO OUR MANOEUVRE NOTIFICATIONS
UP TO NOW HAS SHOWN THAT WE SHOULD ENDEAVOUR NOT TO OVER-
STRAIN OUR IMPLEMENTATION BALANCE, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE
EXPECTED IF THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL WERE TO BE ACCEPTED.

5. FOR THESE REASONS, WE FEEL COMPELLED TO REJECT THE
SWEDISH PROPOSAL.

END TEXT

BEGIN TEXT OF IMS NOTE:

INTRODUCTION

1. THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL, BY LINKING THE TERM "MAJOR MILI-
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TARY MANOEUVRES" TO THE "SMALLER MANOEUVRES CLOSE TO EACH
OTHER IN TIME AND SPACE" WOULD IMPOSE THE SAME OBLIGATION
TO NOTIFY THESE SMALLER MANOEUVRES AS FOR "MAJOR MILITARY
MANOEUVRES "

2. THE OBJECTIVE MAY BE:

- EITHER
- A. TO MINIMISE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE MILITARY
WOULD BREAK "MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES" INTO COMPONENTS
BELOW THE NOTIFIABLE THRESHOLD.
- OR
- B. TO ENSURE THAT SMALLER MANOEUVRES WHICH, IN
COMBINATION, MIGHT APPEAR DESTABILISING OR THREATENING,
ARE NOTIFIED IN THE SAME WAY AS MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES.
- OR
- C. A COMBINATION OF A. OR B.

SCOPE OF THE MEASURE

3. THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL DOES NOT DEFINE THE SMALLER SCALE
MANOEUVRES, EITHER IN FORM OR IN SCALE. PRESUMABLY THE
INTENTION IS TO CONFINE NOTIFICATION TO MANOEUVRES AS
CURRENTLY DEFINED - I.E. FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES INVOLVING
MANOEUVRES AGAINST A SIMULATED ENEMY. VERY MANY FIELD
AND TACTICAL TRAINING ACTIVITIES COULD FALL INTO THAT CAT-
EGORY, EVEN, FOR EXAMPLE, COMPANY OR PLATOON INFANTRY
ASSAULT TRAINING WITHIN OR VERY CLOSE TO BARRACKS.
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4. CLEARLY, THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL IS NOT INTENDED TO CAPTURE SUCH ROUTINE TRAINING, BUT THE LANGUAGE AS CURRENTLY WRITTEN COULD.

5. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE NECESSARY TO WORD THE MEASURE IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT EXCLUDED SUCH ACTIVITIES - PERHAPS BY DEFINING A THRESHOLD FOR THE "SMALLER MILITARY MANOEUVRES", PERHAPS 5,000 OR BRIGADE LEVEL.

TIME AND DISTANCE PARAMETERS

6. THE TIME (15 DAYS) AND DISTANCE (250 KM) CRITERIA IN THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL WOULD INVOLVE ASSESSMENT OF THE FORECAST MANOEUVRE ACTIVITY ON A TWO-DIMENSIONAL BASIS. IT WOULD INVOLVE :-

- A. A GEOGRAPHICAL GRID IN SAY 10 KILO SQUARES WITH EACH GUIDE LINE PROVIDING A STARTING LINE FOR CALCULATION OF NUMBERS OF MEN IN MANOEUVRE. OBVIOUSLY, MANOEUVRES WOULD BE GROSSED WITH OTHERS LYING WITHIN 250 KILOS; AND MANY COULD BE COUNTED TWICE OR EVEN MORE.
 - B. A TIME GRID, SUPERIMPOSED ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL GRID, TO GIVE A 15 DAY SPAN. THUS MANOEUVRES WOULD BE GROSSED UP FOR EACH 15 DAY PERIOD, EVEN WHERE THE ACTIVITY IS NOT CONCURRENT. FOR EXAMPLE, MANY BRIGADE/BATTALION MANOEUVRES COVER ONLY 2 - 3 DAYS IN THE FIELD: THEY WOULD BE FINISHED AND THE MEN BACK IN BARRACKS BEFORE OTHERS IN THE 15 DAY PERIOD HAD STARTED. YET THEY WOULD BE GROSSED, UNDER THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL, AND COULD GIVE A MISLEADING IMPRESSION OF INTENSE MANOEUVRE ACTIVITY. FINALLY, AS IN THE CASE OF THE GEOGRAPHIC GRID, THE START LINE WOULD HAVE TO BE MOVED FORWARD IN TIME EACH DAY : MANY DIFFERENT 15 DAY PERIODS WOULD CAPTURE THE SAME MANOEUVRES, NOTIFYING THEM MORE THAN ONCE - PERHAPS SEVERAL TIMES - AND WOULD
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THUS BE MISLEADING.

OBJECTIVE

7. ASSUMING THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL IS TO CAPTURE MANOEUVRES WHICH, SEPARATELY BELOW THE NOTIFYABLE THRESHOLD, WOULD IN COMBINATION REACH THAT THRESHOLD

AND THEREFORE BE POTENTIALLY DESTABILISING. AN APPROACH WHICH MADE THIS CLEAR WOULD BE SIMPLER AND MIGHT BE MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TIME AND DISTANCE CRITERIA.

8. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR THE ALLIES TO ACCEPT NOTIFICATION OF SMALLER SCALE MANOEUVRES (AT A DEFINED THRESHOLD OF SAY BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL OR 5,000) PLANNED FOR OR TAKING PLACE CONCURRENTLY IN THE SAME MANOEUVRE AREA AND, IN COMBINATION, INVOLVING MORE THAN 25,000 MEN.

MACHINERY

9. THAT ARRANGEMENT WOULD NOT BE INCONSISTENT WITH PRESENT ALLIED PRACICE OF GROSSING UP INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL COMPONENT MANOEUVRES, WITHIN ALLIED OR MULTI-NATIONAL COORDINATIONED MANOEUVRES EXCEEDING THE 25,000 THRESHOLD. IT WILL STILL REQUIRE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE ADMINISTRATIVE EFFORT AND INTER-ALLIED COORDINATION (AND PROBABLY STAFF) THAN THE PRESENT SYSTEM WHICH SIMPLY IDENTIFIES THE MAJOR MANOEUVRES WHICH, BY EXPERIENCE, ARE KNOWN OR EXPECTED TO EXCEED THE 25,000 THRESHOLD; AND THEN COUNTING THE TOTAL OF MEN TAKING PART. UNDER THE ARRANGEMENT AT PARA. 6, IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY FOR ASSURANCE OF FULL IMPLEMENTATION TO HAVE A SYSTEM OF NATIONAL FORECASTS OF PERSONNEL STRENGTH FOR ALL MANOEUVRES AT CONFIDENTIAL

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BRIGADE/REGIMENTAL LEVEL; FOR NATIONS TO REPORT THESE TO A COORDINATING STAFF :-

- A. TO HAVE A SYSTEM OF NATIONAL FORECASTS OF PERSONNEL STRENGTH FOR ALL MANOEUVRES AT BRIGADE/REGIMENTAL LEVEL.
- B. TO HAVE THESE NATIONAL FORECASTS REFERRED TO AN ALLIED OR HOST NATION COORDINATING STAFF.
- C. TO HAVE THAT COORDINATING STAFF PRODUCE COLLATED FORECASTS OF ALL MANOEUVRES NOTIFIABLE UNDER B. ABOVE.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

10. THE UK LETTER (PARA. 4) REQUESTS ADVICE ON THE EFFECTS ON DIFFERENT PARAMETERS. THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE BY REFERENCE TO ALLIED FIELD COMMANDERS (E.G. ARMY GROUPS) AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT RECORDS ARE MAINTAINED IN THE DETAIL AND FORM WHICH WOULD PERMIT PRODUCTION OF AN ACCURATE AND COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS ON THE TIME/DISTANCE GRID SYSTEM.

END TEXT
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, ALLIANCE, CBMS, MILITARY EXERCISES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 26-Oct-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE255884
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: IO/UNA:BJSHARP
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770393-0931
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19771020/aaaaaqmi.tel
Line Count: 280
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: e07a2227-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN IO
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 786560
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CSCE/CBMS: SWEDISH PROPOSAL ON COORDINATED MANEUVERS
TAGS: MARR, MORG, XS, XT, SW, CSCE, NATO
To: USUN NEW YORK
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/e07a2227-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009